Illinois court affirms that she can be fired for peacefully attending the Jan. 6 Trump rally outside the Capitol

Appellate court upholds the firing of Northbrook, Illinois Real estate agent Libby Andrews in a baffling ruling.

I was really curious to understand how any court could justify the firing of Libby Andrews, a Northbrook, Illinois real estate agent for the high crime of attending a Trump rally.

Sounds to me that her attendance is a classic case of how the Constitution should protect her rights of free speech and assembly. How the hell could it not be?

No evidence was presented that she ever entered the Capitol building itself. No evidence proved that she was violent. No evidence of her conspiring, like the far right Proud Boys, to keep the Electoral College from certifying Joe Biden’s election as president.

And yet in the opinion of the Illinois First Appellate Court, she’s toast. The three-judge panel unanimously upheld a lower court decision dismissing Andrews’ suit alleging her company, @propteries, had defamed her and for “intentional interference with a business expectancy” when they widely publicized her firing. To put it bluntly, two Illinois courts have torpedoed her—her career, her reputation and peace of mind.

Libby Andrews’ selfie at the Capitol.

I struggle to make sense of this opinion written by Justice Terrence J. Lavin, Aurelia Pucinski and Mary Ellen Coghlan—Democrats all. I invite all non-lawyers, like myself, to read all 23 pages of legal gobbledegook and honesty say you understand. It is so obtuse, citing every court decision imaginable, that even a layman can detect the justices’ struggle to dismiss the case,

First, Lavin himself defined defamation thusly: “A defamatory statement is one that harms a person’s reputation to the extent that it lowers the person in the eyes of the community or deters others from associating with that person.”

Plunk. Say no more; the facts—if they were really considered—demonstrate that in Andrews case that it is just so. But in pages of mumbo-jumbo, the knife is applied.

Here’s a little bit of the reasoning: She has only herself to blame.

Much of the case seems to rest on pictures and text she posted on social media. One picture shows her outside, not inside, the Capitol. I suppose that’s damning evidence because she looks like she is enjoying herself too much.

The incriminating glass of champaign.

The alleged confession to her misdoing was a picture of a glass of champagne “on a patio and unidentified buildings in the background.” The justice argues that she outed herself by posting this caption with the picture: “After storming the capital (sic) a good good glass of champaign is needed!” The emphasis is the court’s.

No chance that “storming” is hyperbole on her part. Or a choice of mistaken words. Somehow the justices construe “storming” to be an admission of guilt. Even though the evidence that she actually “stormed” the Capitol is absent. Reaching the height of ridiculousness, the justice further explained at some length (you really have to read the whole thing to appreciate the ducking and dodging of the reasoning):

…she used the word “storm.” Excluding any reference to weather, the word “storm” when used as a transitive or intransitive verb means “to attack by storm,” as in “stormed ashore at zero hour,” “to be in or to exhibit a violent passion: RAGE,” such as “storming at the unusual delay,” “to rush about or move impetuously, violently, or angrily,” as in “the mob stormed through the streets,” and “to attack, take, or win over by storm,” as in “storm a fort.” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary… .

Simply put, storming the seat of government, whether it is the city (capital) or building and its grounds (Capitol) signifies an agitation, violent disruption, or forced taking. Andrews reported that she partook in that storm and was present at the Capitol on January 6, notwithstanding plaintiffs’ contention that Andrews herself did not specifically engage in any violent or criminal activity. The slight inaccuracy in defendants’ statement (using Capitol instead of capital) therefore did not substantively alter Andrews’ own statement. Indeed, the common law of libel takes but one approach to the question of falsity, insofar as it overlooks minor inaccuracies to concentrate upon substantial truth; a defendant need not “justify every word of the alleged defamatory matter; it is sufficient if the substance of the charge be proved true, irrespective of slight inaccuracy in the details.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Masson, 501 U.S. at 516-17; see also Coghlan v. Beck, 2013 IL App (1st) 120891, ¶ 42 (noting that as to substantial truth, “allegedly defamatory material is not actionable even where it is not technically accurate in every detail”).

Regardless, the issue in this case is not whether Andrews actually committed destructive or criminal acts on January 6 but rather whether she acknowledged on social media participating in an event wherein such acts were committed. [My emphasis.]

It’s not easy cutting through this sophomoric blather, but if I get it, she’s got no claim because she, in essence, testified against herself. Admitted that she “stormed” the capital. Or is it the Capitol.

Is it possible that the entire case comes down to a misunderstanding of the difference between “Capitol”—the building—and capital—the city itself? Is it enough that she “admitted” that she “stormed” the city? If so, anyone who says that the stormed Washington D.C. to protest has no right to protest. Ludicrous.

Or is the justice saying that Andrews is culpable because she was too close to those who actually stormed into the Capitol?

But again, I’m a non-lawyer mope. Just like the rest of us citizens who are too dull to understand the convoluted reasoning of this court.

Clear out all the hogwash, this is a case directly impacting the right of people to petition their government and to speak their minds. God help not just Ms. Andrews but the rest of us if this doesn’t go to the Supreme Court and gets reverse.

After storming the capital a good glass of champagne is needed!” (emphases added), along with a photo depicting a glass of champagne on a patio and unidentified buildings in the background. S

Terrence J. Lavin Pucinski, Aurelia Mary Ellen Coghlan

Notably, Andrews’ post did not state, “After

a peaceful  protest in Washington, D.C.

,

a good glass of champagne is needed!” or “After

exercising one’s  first amendment rights in Washington, D.C.

,

a good glass of champagne is needed!” Rather, she used the word “storm.” Excluding any reference to weather, the word “storm” when used as a transitive or intransitive verb means “to attack by storm,” as in “stormed ashore at zero hour,” “to be in or to exhibit a violent passion: RAGE,” such as “storming at the unusual delay,” “to rush about or move impetuously, violently, or angrily,” as in “the mob stormed through the streets,” and “to attack, take, or win over by storm,” as in “storm a fort.” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/storming (last visited May 23, 2023) [https://perma.cc/NVN8-DZ8Q].  ¶ 23 Simply put, storming the seat of government, whether it is the city (capital) or building and its grounds (Capitol) signifies an agitation, violent disruption, or forced taking. Andrews reported that she partook in that storm and was present at the Capitol on January 6, notwithstanding plaintiffs’ contention that Andrews herself did not specifically engage in any violent or criminal activity. The slight inaccuracy in defendants’ statement (using Capitol instead of capital) therefore did not substantively alter Andrews’ own statement. Indeed, the common law of libel takes but one approach to the question of falsity, insofar as it overlooks minor inaccuracies to concentrate upon substantial truth; a defendant need not “justify every word of the alleged defamatory matter; it is sufficient if the substance of the charge be proved true, irrespective of slight inaccuracy in the details.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

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violent or criminal activity. The slight inaccuracy in defendants’ statement (using Capitol instead of capital) therefore did not substantively alter Andrews’ own statement. Indeed, the common law of libel takes but one approach to the question of falsity, insofar as it overlooks minor inaccuracies to concentrate upon substantial truth; a defendant need not “justify every word of the alleged defamatory matter; it is sufficient if the substance of the charge be proved true, irrespective of slight inaccuracy in the details.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

 Masson

, 501 U.S. at 516-17; see also

Coghlan v. Beck 

, 2013 IL App (1st) 120891, ¶ 42 (noting that as to substantial truth, “allegedly defamatory material is not actionable even where it is not technically accurate in every detail”). Regardless, the issue in this case is not whether Andrews actually committed destructive or criminal acts on January 6 but rather whether she acknowledged on social media participating in an event wherein such acts were committed.